Borje Holmberg

In his reply to my article Dr. Devlin considers on the one hand the use of the term discipline, on the other hand basic epistemological principles.

My definition of discipline is that of a clearly defined area of academic study that has caused both research and university teaching. In this sense distance education is a discipline, as shown in my article, albeit a new and not very well-developed one (an emerging discipline?). If other criteria than mine are applied the conclusions may be different and it seems proper to ask Dr. Devlin's question "why status as a discipline is important." To quite a few scholars adult education, for example, is no discipline as it relies also on other areas of research than its own.

Distance education research includes theory building and theory testing. I wholeheartedly share Dr. Devlin's view that values have no scholarly status. Scholarly research on individualization, autonomy, and other problems mentioned can be concerned with description of principles and practice, their background and interpretation, as well as with empirical testing of the outcomes of relevant activities. Some work is being done on this, as indicated in my book of 1986 (pp. 87-94). What Dr. Devlin or I may think is proper has certainly no scholarly value. I agree that it "may be valid judgement but it is not social science."

In fact I feel Dr. Devlin and I are on the same side epistemologically - at least to some extent. We both reject partisanship in research and thus, implicitly, can be little impressed with Marxist approaches and the members of the Frankfurt School (such as Adorno [1975] who compares the separation of value judgment from research with capitulation before power and Jurgen Habermas [1968] who states that such a separation deprives analyticalempirical investigations of their contact with reality [Lebensbezug]). I have developed my thinking on this in two papers in 1985 and 1986 and am glad to see that I have Dr. Devlin's support on this issue in any case. There may be a difference in approach, however. Dr. Devlin may represent logical empiricism whereas I am more of a rationalist in Popper's (1980) and Lakatos' (1970) sense.

I was not surprised to read that my "idea of a single theory...is extremely unconvincing." I have some understanding of Dr. Devlin's thinking here. It is a tall order to develop such a comprehensive theory, perhaps too tall, but it is worth trying. The important thing if a theory is to be convincing is that the hypotheses generated from it are empirically tested in a rigorous way. That is what I do by making falsification attempts in Popper's spirit. So far I have published only an attempted teaching theory for distance education (generating testable hypotheses in ten areas), but I am continuing this work. It certainly complies with Dr. Devlin's demand for empirical testing. The attempt, if not the outcome, should be acceptable.

References

Adorno, Th. W. (1975). Der Positivismusstreit in der Deutschen Soziologie.

Darmstadt/Neuwied: Luchterhand. Habermas, J. (1968). Erkenntnis und Interesse. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Holmberg, B. (1985). The feasibility of a theory of teaching for distance education and a proposed theory. ZIFF-Papiere 60. Hagen: FernUniversität.

Holmberg, B. (1986a). Growth and structure of distance education. London: Croom Helm.

Holmberg, B. (1986b). Theoretical approaches, categories and methods described as educational models. ZIFF-Papiere 62. Hagen: FernUniversität.

Lakatos, J. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In J. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Popper, K. (1980). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.